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ABSTRACT 
Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU*
by Ela Glowicka 
Governments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid. 
I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: 
the impact of bailouts on bankruptcy probability and the determinants of bailout 
policy. I have three main results. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate 
increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, 
suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The 
number of failing bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. 
Second, governments’ bailout decisions favored public firms, even though 
public firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, 
subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Wirksamkeit von Beihilfe in der EU 
Europäische Unternehmen, die in Schwierigkeiten geraten sind, werden 
regelmäßig von den Regierungen in der EU durch Rettungs- und 
Restrukturierungsbeihilfen (R&R-Beihilfen) unterstützt. Im vorliegenden Paper 
werden 86 von der Europäischen Kommission überprüfte Fälle von R&R-
Beihilfen zwischen 1995 und 2003 herangezogen, um zwei Probleme zu 
untersuchen: die Auswirkung von R&R-Beihilfen auf die Bankrotthäufigkeit und 
die bestimmenden Faktoren für Subventionspolitik der Regierungen.   
 
Dabei kommt die Studie zu drei Ergebnissen. Es zeigt sich, dass sich die 
geschätzte Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit während der ersten vier Jahre nach der 
Beihilfe erhöht und danach sinkt. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass einige Beihilfen 
den Marktaustritt nur verzögern, anstatt ihn zu verhindern. Die Zahl der Firmen, 
die erfolglos Beihilfe bekommen, könnte durch eine strengere europäische 
Beihilfekontrolle verringert werden. Das zweite Ergebnis besagt, dass die 
Regierungen bei der Beihilfevergabe staatliche Unternehmen bevorzugt haben, 
obwohl staatliche Unternehmen gegenüber den privaten keine bessere 
Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit haben. Drittens ist die Beihilfewahl eine 
endogene Variable in der Analyse der Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit. Sie als 
exogen zu behandeln bedeutet, ihre Auswirkung auf die 
Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit zu unterschätzen. 
 
iv 1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the eﬀectiveness of bailouts in the European Union
(EU). Bailouts in the EU are pursued by governments in order to save endangered jobs, support
development in certain regions, or promote a certain type of economic activity. Such subsidies
also have an impact on competition in the European common market, therefore the European
Commission strictly controls them: whenever a government wants to bail out a ﬁrm, it must get
an approval from the Commission. I examine the eﬀectiveness of bailouts in maintaining survival
of ﬁrms in distress and I assess European bailout control from this perspective. I also provide
empirical evidence on the criteria used by governments in their bailout decisions.
The reasons why some governments bail out are often of political nature. Helping a ﬁrm
in trouble draws media attention and voters’ sympathy, as in the case of Germany’s chancellor,
Gerhard Schr¨ oder, who gained on political support after bailing out the construction ﬁrm Philipp
Holzmann.1 Governments may also lack commitment to a hard no-bailout policy, creating soft-
budget constraints for ﬁrms. This is particularly likely in the case of public ﬁrms (Maskin and Xu
(2001)). Potentially, there are also economic reasons for bailouts. If a failing ﬁrm is a monopolist
in providing statewide services necessary for economic activities, e.g. railways, a bailout may be
needed to avoid a large negative externality on the whole economy (Segal (1998)). A bailout
might also be a part of the strategic trade policy with the aim of increasing the market power of
domestic ﬁrms, at the cost of competing ﬁrms from other countries (G  lowicka (2005)). Finally, if
the bankruptcy results in many lost jobs in a region with high unemployment, a bailout might be
socially justiﬁed.
Bailouts are frequently undertaken by EU governments and paid with taxes. Between 1992 and
2003, 79 ﬁrms in diﬃculty were supported by European governments with the aid often expressed
in billions of euros.2 Governments support ﬁrms for a short period of time to help them work out
the plan of further action (rescue subsidy) or they subsidize the restructuring process in the ﬁrm
(restructuring aid). Every bailout decision must be notiﬁed to the European Commission. This
is required, because a bailout is a highly selective subsidy: its recipient is one speciﬁc ineﬃcient
ﬁrm, which cannot stay in the market without public support. This kind of aid is likely to distort
competition, since it acts directly against competitive forces, which led to the risk of exit. In this
1A good illustration of the perception of this decision is a title page of Tageszeitung on the day after the bailout
decision, Nov. 26, 1999: ”Holzmann bails out Schr¨ oder” (”Holzmann saniert Schr¨ oder”), suggesting that it was
actually Schr¨ oder’s political career which was bailed out.
2For example, in 2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG received EUR 9,7 bn rescue and restructuring aid, while the
total aid, less agriculture and railways, granted by 15 EU member states amounted to EUR 49 bn.
1way, countries might try to increase market share of their national champions at the cost of ﬁrms
from other countries. Such practices are forbidden in the EU by the European competition law,
but they can be granted an exemption according to Article 87 of the EC Treaty. Here, countries’
industrial policies and EU’s competition policy meet and engage in a battle: governments bail out
ﬁrms of their choice pursuing their own unilateral policies, but the Commission forbids the aid if
it adversely aﬀects fair competition in the common market. Bailouts in particular are regulated
by the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Diﬃculty3
and in the EU terminology are called rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid. The European state
aid control is now under a ”comprehensive, coherent and far-reaching reform” with an objective
of ”less and better targeted state aid”.4 For this process, a better understanding of how R&R
subsidies have worked in the past would be useful.
Bailout control takes place mainly in Europe, as there is no equivalent bailout policy in the
United States. A recent exception is perhaps the Air Transportation Stabilization Board created
by the Congress in 2001 with the objective of supporting airline survival after the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center. Vig (2004) describes activities of this Board as a dismal failure, since
none of the big carriers was saved by the loan guarantee program announced by the Board. The
reason was that the carriers did not want to give away equity stakes in return for the bailout,
which was one of the conditions of getting the loan. This outcome is a warning that subsidizing
ﬁrms in diﬃculty is not an easy task.
I analyze R&R aid granted to 79 ﬁrms from 10 EU countries during the years 1992-2003. I create
a data set from four information sources: decision texts of the Commission, London Economics
(2004) report to the Commission, the AMADEUS data base and newspapers. The list of bailed-
out ﬁrms is ﬁxed and I collect additional information on these ﬁrms, which makes it a unique
data set. Whatever the objective of a bailout, a necessary condition for achieving this objective
is preventing bankruptcy.5 If a bailed-out ﬁrm nevertheless goes bankrupt, none of the potential
objectives can be achieved. Bankruptcy is deﬁned as ceasing operations of a ﬁrm. Sometimes ﬁrms
become insolvent, sell most of their assets, reduce employment dramatically and stay active in the
market. I deﬁne this situation also as a bankruptcy.
I study three issues. First, I ask the question: how did the risk of bankruptcy change after
3OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p.2.
4Reforming Europes State Aid Regime: An Action Plan for Change, speech by Neelie Kroes, who is a Member of
the European Commission in charge of Competition Policy, during the Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr and
the University of Leiden joint conference on European State Aid Reform. Brussels, 14th June 2005.
5This is not a suﬃcient condition of success, as problems other than bankruptcy may arise: in the long term
surviving ﬁrm may need to be supported again or social beneﬁts may turn out to be lower than economic costs.
Using this approach, I will thus tend to underestimate potential distortions caused by the bailouts.
2the bailout? To provide an answer, I estimate the hazard rate of all R&R aid beneﬁciaries. The
results show that in the ﬁrst four years after the bailout ﬁrms exit at an increasing rate. This
indicates that a bankruptcy after the bailout does not occur randomly, but is a result of a wasteful
behavior: ﬁrms went bankrupt with delay, because they could aﬀord to survive a bit longer with
the means granted by the state. Prediction from the hazard equation suggest that the Commission
could have reduced this phenomenon by prohibiting rescue aid in sectors with small externalities
on the economy. The required standard of proof in the Commission’s bailout approvals should be
at least a 70% chance of survival for four years after the bailout. That would reduce the number
of approved bailouts that end up in bankruptcy.
Second, I investigate determinants of governments’ decisions to grant rescue versus restruc-
turing subsidies. Firms receiving a restructuring subsidy go bankrupt less often than rescue aid
receivers. Allocation of these two types of aid to diﬀerent ﬁrms is therefore a tool for discrimina-
tion. I ﬁnd that public ﬁrms receive restructuring aid with higher probability due to governments’
preference for public employment. Once I control for public employment, being a public ﬁrm be-
comes a disadvantage in chances for restructuring aid. All public ﬁrms which were later privatized
received exclusively restructuring aid, as well as public ﬁrms older than 100 years. This special
position of state-owned ﬁrms is likely to cause soft budget constraints. I also ﬁnd a strong time
trend in the data: after the year 2000 rescue aid was 68% more likely than restructuring aid. This
is likely to be a result of a political campaign at the European level to reduce R&R aid, which
started with the Lisbon Agenda in 2000. As a consequence of this tendency, however, ﬁrms are
granted aid which is less eﬃcient in preventing bankruptcy.
Third, I reject the hypothesis that the subsidy type is exogenous in the hazard estimation.
Governments select ﬁrms that get more comprehensive restructuring aid and inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s
survival chances by this choice. The impact of the endogenous subsidy type on the hazard rate
is stronger than in the case of the exogenous subsidy type. Thus, without taking the endogeneity
into account, the eﬀect of the subsidy type on the hazard is underestimated.
The most closely related literature is empirical bankruptcy prediction. Studies of bankruptcy
typically use survival analysis to predict duration of Chapter 11 protection in the American bank-
ruptcy law. Bandopadhyaya (1994) ﬁnds the counterintuitive result that the higher the outstanding
interest of the ﬁrm, the earlier the ﬁrm gets over its diﬃculties. His explanation is that creditors
are more willing to compromise during negotiations when the debt is high. Li (1999) develops a
Bayesian approach to hazard estimation. In both of these papers, the probability of exiting Chap-
3ter 11 protection increases during the ﬁrst two years. My result is exactly opposite: the probability
of bankruptcy increases with time during the ﬁrst four years. Although not directly comparable,
R&R aid is less eﬃcient in preventing ﬁrms’ bankruptcy than Chapter 11 protection. The biggest
diﬀerence between Chapter 11 and R&R aid is the incentives they create. Managers avoid Chapter
11 ex ante, since the likely outcome of starting bankruptcy proceedings is that creditors will get
a part of the equity. In addition, under Chapter 11 protection ﬁrms incur legal and opportunity
costs. R&R aid, in turn, never requires a transfer of equity to creditors. It allows to continue
operation by a subsidy from the taxpayers. Thus, the incentives of European managers to avoid
bankruptcy are not as strong. Therefore, I provide empirical support for the suggestion of Nitsche
and Heidhues (2006) that R&R aid should be linked to bankruptcy proceedings, for example by
granting aid only to ﬁrms that are legally bankrupt. This condition would not be uniform in the
whole EU, since so far there is no common bankruptcy law for the member states.6
Papers evaluating state aid programs are popular (for an overview see Heckman (2001)), but
concerning bailouts in the EU the only empirical analysis is by Chindooroy et al. (2005) (based
on the LE report (2004) done by the same authors). Their paper provides summary statistics
about the cases and a discrete choice estimation of survival probability. They ﬁnd that about
30% of R&R aid beneﬁciaries went bankrupt, which they attribute to the business cycle. My
paper is diﬀerent from theirs in several ways. Since hazard models give better survival probability
estimates (Shumway (2001)), I use the hazard approach.7 It allows me to compare R&R aid to
the Chapter 11 protection. I also analyze governments’ bailout policies, which is an entirely new
research topic. Finally, I show that the subsidy type cannot be treated as an exogenous variable
in studying survival probability. According to my estimates, subsidy choice and bankruptcy are
interdependent outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the legal framework for bailouts
in the EU and provides some summary statistics on how the guidelines were applied during the
years 1995-2003. Next, I estimate the hazard rate of R&R aid beneﬁciaries, compare it to Chapter
11 hazard rates and assess the eﬀectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. In section 4, I
empirically examine governments’ choices to grant rescue versus restructuring aid. In section 5, I
explore the endogeneity of the subsidy choice in the hazard rate analysis. Finally, I conclude in
the last section.
6A comparison of bankruptcy systems in Sweden, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States can be
found in Couwenberg (2001), who draws attention to the important role of asset sale in retaining viability.
7Jenkins (2005) provides an excellent guide to discrete-time hazard rate estimation.
42 Rescue and restructuring subsidies in the European state aid
control
2.1 State aid in the EC Treaty
Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty provides legal constraints to state aid in the EU. State aid is
incompatible with the common market, and therefore in general prohibited, when it fulﬁls four
conditions: it is granted from state resources, distorts or threatens to distort competition, favors
certain undertakings, and aﬀects trade between member states. Article 88 makes the European
Commission responsible for the control of the compatibility of all state aid measures in the member
states.
Article 87 (3) gives the Commission the power to grant exemptions to state aid prohibition.
R&R aid is exempted based on Article 87(3c): ”aid to facilitate the development of certain eco-
nomic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely aﬀect trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”8 may be considered compatible with the
common market. Also Article 87(3a) is referred to as a reason for exemptions: ”aid to promote
the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there
is serious underemployment”9 may be considered compatible with common market. The reasons
for exemptions are often summarized as facilitation of social and regional cohesion: governments
want to support certain industries or sustain jobs in poor or dependent on one big ﬁrm regions.
Detailed rules, according to which the Commission grants the exemption, are speciﬁed in the Com-
munity Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Diﬃculty, described in
the remainder of this section.
R&R subsidies are covered by a de minimis rule:10 aid that does not exceed EUR 100 000
over a continuous period of three years is not considered incompatible with the common market.
The rule was introduced to reduce the cost of administrative burden on the Commission created
by state aid control and to facilitate subsidies for small and medium enterprizes (SME), which are
expected to use low amounts of R&R aid more often. The ceiling amount in the de minimis rule
is a gross grant or its equivalent. The rule does not apply to transport, shipbuilding, agriculture,
ﬁsheries sectors, export-related activities, and aid promoting domestic over imported products.
8OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, p.67.
9ibid.
10OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p.30. On March 9, 2006 the Commission proposed to increase the ceiling of the de minimis
rule to 150 000 EUR, but the decision to adopt it was not yet made.
52.2 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms
in Diﬃculty
The guidelines explain the way the European Commission exercises its discretion in the ﬁeld of
bailouts. The ﬁrst guidelines were adopted in 1994, they were amended in 1999 and 2004, and
the current version - on which I focus here - stays in power until 9 October 2009. The general
approach of the Commission to R&R aid is that this is the most questionable type of subsidies,
since it is directed towards ineﬃcient ﬁrms and it is very likely to act against competitive forces
that would drive the ﬁrm out of the market. According to the guidelines, R&R subsidies are
justiﬁed only in three circumstances: by social or regional considerations, to support small and
medium-sized enterprizes, and in presence of a menace of high market concentration. While the
ﬁrst two objectives are a matter of social judgement, the last one is an economic issue.
The guidelines deﬁne a ﬁrm liable to R&R aid, called a ﬁrm in diﬃculty, as ”unable, whether
through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owners/shareholders or
creditors, to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost
certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.” Such ﬁrms typically
have ”increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining
cash ﬂow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value”.11 This includes
also ﬁrms that ﬁled for insolvency, subsidiaries of ﬁrms that are also in diﬃculty, or subsidiaries,
which prove that the state of diﬃculty is their own responsibility and the parent cannot help. Newly
created ﬁrms (up to 3 years old) are not eligible for R&R aid. The most important element of the
deﬁnition is that without the subsidy the ﬁrm would exit the market - only a state intervention
can keep it alive.
Bailouts consist of two kinds of subsidies: rescue and restructuring.12 While a rescue subsidy is
meant to keep the ﬁrm in operation for the time needed to asses the situation and prepare a plan
of further action, restructuring aid is a long-term assistance in implementation of the restructuring
plan, which must aim at restoring ﬁrm’s viability. Each of rescue and restructuring subsidies can
be granted only once every ten years (ﬁve in the agricultural sector). This is the so-called one time
- last time principle and refers to all types of beneﬁciaries: large ﬁrms, groups of ﬁrms, ﬁrms in
assisted areas and SME’s. If both aid types are granted, the order also matters: rescue aid should
11The guidelines, p.C 244/3.
12A bailout does not need to be a transfer of resources, it may also be soft position in debt recovery. For example,
when ﬁrms in a deteriorating condition do not pay taxes or social security obligations and public institutions are more
patient in recovering the debt than a private creditor would be, the ﬁrm gets an advantage over its competitors. This
was the main issue in the case C-276/02 in the European Court of Justice, as discussed in Nicolaides and Kekelekis
(2005).
6be given before restructuring aid, otherwise the restructuring process proves to be not successful
in restoring viability and a ﬁrm is not eligible for the rescue subsidy. From an economic point
of view, strict application of the one time - last time principle is crucial, since it helps reducing
eﬃciency distortions caused by soft-budget constraints.
Rescue aid can be granted as a loan or a loan guarantee at a market interest rate for a maximum
of six months. After that time, a restructuring or a liquidation plan must be presented to the
Commission. In principle, there is a maximum amount of rescue aid, which depends on earnings
before interest and taxes, depreciation and working capital according to a formula in the appendix
to the guidelines, but exceptions are possible.
Restructure subsidy is granted only to those ﬁrms that present a market survey and a convincing
plan of restoring the ﬁrm’s long-term viability. If the market power of the beneﬁciary is signiﬁcant,
the Commission imposes compensatory measures such as divestiture of assets or reduction in
capacity. The beneﬁciary is expected to make a signiﬁcant contribution to cover restructuring
costs: 25% in case of a small ﬁrm, 40% for a medium-sized ﬁrm and 50% for a large ﬁrm. The
implementation of the restructuring plan should be communicated to the Commission by reports
at least annually.
Aid for large ﬁrms must be notiﬁed individually each time, while for SMEs aid schemes are
possible. SME’s (but not from the agricultural sector) and ﬁrms from assisted areas have less strict
rules as far as compensatory measures and reporting are concerned. The guidelines do not apply
to coal and steel sectors.
To sum up, the guidelines deﬁne conditions for public support to ﬁrms in diﬃculty as strict
as possible, so that aid is compatible with the common market and is granted only to ﬁrms with
the highest chance of survival. Governments have to prove that expected social beneﬁts of R&R
aid (usually understood as the number of jobs saved) outweigh economic costs. To achieve these
potential gains, survival of the beneﬁciary is a necessary condition.
2.3 Summary statistics on bailout decisions
In the time period from 1995 to 2003, the Commission made 86 decisions on granting individual
R&R subsidies to 79 ﬁrms from 10 EU countries. In this section, I have a closer look at the
summary statistics for various aspects of the subsidy decisions. A cross-sectional data set is used,
with each decision as a unit observation.13
The decisions I analyze were made during the years 1995-2003. The starting year is 1995, which
13For the description of the data set construction procedure, see the Appendix.
7is the ﬁrst year when decisions were based on the guidelines on R&R aid. In some cases, however,
the subsidy was notiﬁed ex post, hence the year of granting aid was earlier than the decision itself.
The last year is 2003, just before the EU enlargement and introduction of the new version of the
guidelines. The most aid-intensive period was 1996-1998 with 13-15 subsidies granted each year.
After 1998, the number of cases has halved and oscillated around 7 (see table 1).
Table 1: Year of granting R&R subsidy.
Subsidy year Rescue cases Restructuring cases Total
1992 0 1 1
1993 0 1 1
1994 1 5 6
1995 3 5 8
1996 5 8 13
1997 6 9 15
1998 3 11 14
1999 1 5 6
2000 0 2 2
2001 6 2 8
2002 6 2 8
2003 3 1 4
Total 34 52 86
Population: Cross-section of decisions.
There is a clear tendency of granting more rescue aid in recent years. Before 2001, the number
of rescue cases was lower than restructuring aid cases. Starting with 2001, this tendency was
reversed. The change in the pattern coincides with the European Commission’s increased political
eﬀorts to limit state aid. For example, the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 encouraged the EU governments
to cut state aid for ineﬃcient ﬁrms and redirect it to ﬁrms with potential for innovation and growth.
Diﬀerences between rescues and restructures
The nature of a rescue subsidy as deﬁned by the guidelines is very diﬀerent from restructuring
aid. While the former can be granted to any ﬁrm with an acute problem as a short-term solution,
restructuring aid is a long-term assistance with viability as an objective. Table 2 reveals that
diﬀerences indeed exist. For each subsidy type, I report the total number of ﬁrms receiving such
aid, followed by the number of state-owned and private ﬁrms, the number of bankrupt and surviving
ﬁrms, the number of ﬁrms sold after the subsidy and average employment. State-ownership means
that the state controls more than 50% of the ﬁrm’s capital. Bankruptcy and sale are observed in
the time period between the subsidy and 2003. Note that ownership status is known only for 69
ﬁrms and survival status only for 75 ﬁrms (bottom row of table 2).
8Table 2: Diﬀerences between subsidy types.
Subsidy type Total State -owned Private Bankrupt Survived Sold Avg.
empl
Rescue 27 5 19 13 13 4 3404
Double rescue 1 1 0 1 0 0 1791
Restructure 45 21 17 8 34 18 6333
Double restructure 1 1 0 0 1 0 3508
Rescue and restructure 5 2 3 0 5 1 8730
Total 79 30 39 22 53 23 5340
Population: Cross-section of ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst observation is that there were many more restructuring aid than rescue aid cases.
Seven ﬁrms received a double subsidy. Five of them were rescue cases followed by restructuring
aid, which is the pattern promoted by the guidelines. In the other two cases, the one time -last time
principle was clearly violated. Nearly a half of restructuring aid cases concerned state-owned ﬁrms,
while less than one-ﬁfth of rescue cases involved public ﬁrms. In addition, only state-owned ﬁrms
beneﬁted from the two cases breaking the one time -last time principle. The null hypothesis that
ownership and the subsidy type are independent is rejected based on the Pearson’s chi-squared
test at 5% signiﬁcance level.14 If one agrees that restructuring aid is more attractive to ﬁrms
in diﬃculty than rescue aid, then state-owned ﬁrms had a favorable treatment. Ultimately, it is
governments who bail out and they are also the owner of public ﬁrms. Therefore, governments may
be exploiting the institution of bailouts in the interest of their ﬁrms. This should not be diﬃcult.
Restructuring aid is always tailored to the speciﬁcities of the ﬁrm in trouble. The government
has an inﬂuence on the length and amount of public support, on the instrument used, and the
restructuring process undertaken.
Turning to the bankruptcy rate, 22 ﬁrms went bankrupt, which makes about 30% of all bailed-
out ﬁrms. The distribution of bankruptcies is biased towards rescues: a half of all rescue aid cases
ended up with a bankruptcy, compared with less than a quarter of restructuring aid cases. The null
hypothesis that the type of subsidy is independent of bankruptcy is rejected based on the Pearson’s
test at 2% signiﬁcance level. The bias towards rescues is natural given the characteristics of rescue
aid, which is only temporary and is not meant to support a restructuring process. Restructuring
aid, however, should never end up with bankruptcy -its aim is to get the ﬁrm back to viability.
This aim was not achieved in 8 cases out of 45 total (17.7%).
Regarding the distribution of ﬁrms that were sold to a new owner after receiving the subsidy,
14This is only very weak evidence of the correlation, since I have few observations and Pearson’s chi-squared test
uses a limit distribution.
9a higher proportion of restructured ﬁrms were sold than the proportion of rescued ﬁrms. This
suggests that a restructuring subsidy can be used to increase the value of a ﬁrm in diﬃculty
before sale, for example before privatization. Out of 28 state-owned ﬁrms, 13 were privatized after
receiving a restructuring subsidy. In a few cases, privatization was even a condition for R&R aid
approval demanded by the Commission. All privatized ﬁrms survived.
Finally, looking at average employment, ﬁrms with restructuring aid had on average more
employees than ﬁrms receiving rescue aid. This suggests a too-big-to-fail eﬀect, meaning that big
ﬁrms get more support from the state in case of distress, because their exit would potentially have
a large negative externality on the state-wide or regional economy.
Bailout policies in European countries
EU member states use R&R subsidies in a very diﬀerentiated way. Table 3 highlights the diﬀerences
across countries in detail. For each country, I report the total number of subsidized ﬁrms, the
number of rescue and restructuring subsidy types granted, the number of state-owned and private
ﬁrms, the number of bankrupt and surviving ﬁrms, the number of ﬁrms sold after the subsidy, and
ﬁnally, average employment in subsidized ﬁrms.
Table 3: Diﬀerences across countries.
Country Firms
No.
Restr. Rescue Public Private Bankrupt Survived Sold Avg. empl.
Greece 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 7 529
Netherlands 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 906
Austria 4 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 390
UK 4 2 2 2 2 0 4 2 4 640
France 11 9 3 9 2 0 11 6 19 187
Portugal 4 4 1 1 1 0 3 1 141
Spain 10 8 2 5 5 4 6 2 928
Italy 15 10 6 6 5 6 7 5 5 447
Belgium 4 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 3 037
Germany 24 12 14 3 20 9 15 5 3 774
Total 79 52 34 30 39 22 53 23 5 340
Population: Cross-section of decisions.
Germany leads with 24 bailed-out ﬁrms, followed by Italy, France and Spain with 15, 11 and
10 ﬁrms respectively. Notably, there are also 5 member states that did not bailout any ﬁrm (not
in the table): Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg and Sweden. While in case of Luxemburg
one can have doubts if this result is because of government’s policy or economy size, in the other
four cases it looks like a hard no-bailout policy.
A comparison of the policies of Germany and France provides interesting insights. Among 24
10Germany’s beneﬁciaries, the majority received rescue aid. Only 3 beneﬁciaries were state-owned
and employment was lower than the total average. In contrast, France used mainly restructuring
aid, mainly directed to state-owned ﬁrms and had the highest number of sold ﬁrms. French
bailed-out ﬁrms employed four times more people than the total average and none of them went
bankrupt. These two policies seem to be opposites. Germany provides short-term support for
smaller private ﬁrms, while France uses R&R aid to restructure huge state-owned ﬁrms. Italy’s
and Spain’s policy is similar to that of France, but the majority of Italian ﬁrms went bankrupt
and Spanish governments supported much smaller ﬁrms.
Diﬀerences in countries’ policy can also be found in the distribution of industries, from which
the bailed out ﬁrms came (I use a 2-digit NACE codes as industry classiﬁcation, see table 14 in the
Appendix). The distribution is presented in table 4. Some countries grant R&R aid mainly in
Table 4: Countries’ bailouts per industry.
Country
Industry EL NL AT UK FR PT ES IT BE DE Total
services . . . . 2 . . 2 1 1 6
ﬁnance . . . 1 5 . . 2 . 1 9
transport 1 . . 2 3 . . 1 2 2 11
electric water . . . 1 . . . . . . 1
trade . . . . . . 1 . . 1 2
construction . . 1 . . 1 1 6 . 2 11
manufacturing . 2 3 . 1 3 7 3 1 17 37
mining . . . . . . 1 1 . . 2
Total 1 2 4 4 11 4 10 15 4 24 79
Population: Cross-section of ﬁrms.
sectors, where negative externalities of a bankruptcy may be painful for the whole economy (e.g.
UK). Other countries bail out in sectors, where such externalities are unlikely to exist (Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal, Spain). Finally, there are countries that grant R&R aid economy-wide (Italy,
Germany, France). The Pearson’s test rejects the hypothesis that the industry and the country of
R&R aid receivers are independent.
Characteristics of bailed-out ﬁrms
Table 5 presents summary statistics about R&R aid beneﬁciaries. Industries supported by R&R
aid are state-wide infrastructure providers in transport, electricity/water supply and banking, but
also manufacturing and construction sectors, trade, and services. A striking observation is that
nearly half of all cases involved the manufacturing industry, a third of which went bankrupt after


















new owner 23 0
Total 73 21
Population: Cross-section of ﬁrms.
receiving the aid. A high share went also to the construction sector, where bankruptcies were more
common: 6 out of 10 ﬁrms left the market. There were no bankruptcies in the ﬁnancial, trade and
electricity and water supply sectors. There are fewer state-owned ﬁrms than private ones (at least
among those for which I know their ownership status), which clearly indicates that R&R aid is
not used to support only the public sector. But state-owned ﬁrms tend to go bankrupt less often
than private ones. All ﬁrms which were sold after the subsidy survived.
Table 6: Other ﬁrm characteristics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age (years) 66 58 69.3 1 457
Average employment 75 5 340 11 768 36 69 671
Population: Cross-section of ﬁrms.
Table 6 reports summary statistics about age and employment. Age is deﬁned as the number
of years passed between incorporation and the subsidy. R&R beneﬁciaries are 58 years old on
average. There is one ﬁrm that was only 1 year old when it was subsidized, which is against the
rules of the guidelines, since ﬁrms younger than 4 years cannot be bailed out. There is also one
457 years old ﬁrm. Average employment is the average number of people employed in the period
between the bailout and the year 2003.15 It reached 5340, indicating that bailed-out ﬁrms were on
15I use average employment to indicate the size of the ﬁrms. Due to numerous missing data in this variable, I
12average large.
Summary
The overview on how R&R aid was granted highlights two typical problems with R&R aid: high
mortality rate and a strong inﬂuence of political economy issues.
Bankruptcy rate amounts to about 30% of all beneﬁciaries and 17% of restructuring aid ben-
eﬁciaries. Given that one of the objectives of the guidelines is to make sure that aid is not given
to ﬁrms with low survival chances, this bankruptcy rate suggests possible shortcomings in the
Commission’s decision-making process.
The political economy of R&R involves at least three issues. Public ﬁrms get more restructuring
aid than private ﬁrms. Governments’ bailout policies are very heterogenous across countries and
vary from a hard no-bailout approach to frequently given support to ﬁrms from various industries.
Finally, a few cases break one time - last time principle, indicating that the guidelines were not
the only criterion of the Commission when approving the subsidy.
I address these two issues in the next sections. In section 3 I evaluate bailouts in terms
of eﬀectiveness in ensuring suﬃciently high probability of survival and in section 4 I analyze
governments’s bailout policies.
3 Hazard rate for bailed-out ﬁrms and European bailout control
The subsidized ﬁrm’ survival is a necessary condition for achieving the bailout’s objectives, e.g.
save jobs or prevent a domino eﬀect. R&R aid is supposed to be granted to ﬁrms with high survival
chances. It is particularly true in case of restructuring aid, which is required to bring the ﬁrm
back to viability. Survival patterns are therefore an important information for the assessment of
bailouts’ eﬀectiveness: bankrupt implies that they failed.
I have already established the key statistics: 14 rescue and 8 restructuring aid receivers went
bankrupt, nearly 30% of the total number of the bailed-out ﬁrms. A tool to explore survival
patterns in more detail is a hazard rate. The hazard rate relates the probability of bankruptcy in
a given year to ﬁrms’ characteristics and the time passed since the bailout. Based on R&R aid
characteristics discussed before, I would expect that some of the rescue aid recipients go bankrupt
shortly after a bailout and for the remaining ﬁrms, the probability of bankruptcy decreases to
levels close to zero. In this section, I examine if it is indeed the case.
cannot use employment in the subsidy year.
13In the estimation I use an unbalanced panel data set.16 I examine 75 R&R aid beneﬁciaries
for which the surviving status in known. The time unit is a calendar year. It starts being counted
from the year when the subsidy was given and it stops in the year of bankruptcy or in 2003, if the
ﬁrm survived until then (these are the censored observations, which receive a special treatment in
the methodology I will use). Descriptive statistics of survival data are reported in table 7. One










fourth of all observations comes from bankrupt ﬁrms. Average survival time for bankrupt ﬁrms is
by nearly two years lower than for censored ﬁrms.
3.1 Descriptive statistics for survival patterns
As a description of survival patterns in the data, I compute lifetable estimators17 presented in table
8. I use actuarial adjustment to account for the fact that censored observations in each period
do not happen all at once.18 Empirical survivor function is deﬁned for each year as a proportion
of ﬁrms surviving at least until that year. Empirical hazard function in year j is an estimate of
the probability of going bankrupt in year j, conditional on surviving until that year.19 The ﬁrst
row of the table can be read as follows: during the year when they received the subsidy, 4 ﬁrms
out of 75 went bankrupt. Four other ﬁrms went out of the sample, which means that they were
subsidized in 2003 and survived that year. The proportion of surviving ﬁrms equals 0.9452 with a
standard error of 0.0266, while the probability of going bankrupt in the ﬁrst year after the subsidy
is 0.0563 with a standard error of 0.0282.
The highest number of bankruptcies took place in the fourth year after the subsidy and it
remained low after that (column 3). This suggests that the ﬁrst four years are crucial in making a
16For details, see the Appendix.
17All estimations are done with STATA 9.
18Actuarial adjustment is used when the underlying survival time is continuous, but the data is given in discrete
time. It assumes that censored observations leave the sample uniformly in each period. The adjusted number of
observations in a given period equals the total number of observations minus a half of censored observations ending
in this period. For more details see Jenkins(2005).
19For deﬁnitions, see Jenkins(2005).
14Table 8: Lifetable estimates.
Year Beg. Total Bankruptcies Lost Survival St. Error Hazard St. Error
1 75 4 4 0.9452 0.0266 0.0563 0.0282
2 67 2 5 0.9159 0.0329 0.0315 0.0223
3 60 4 6 0.8516 0.0435 0.0727 0.0363
4 50 6 1 0.7484 0.0550 0.1290 0.0526
5 43 1 3 0.7304 0.0566 0.0244 0.0244
6 39 0 8 0.7304 0.0566 0.0000 .
7 31 1 9 0.7028 0.0608 0.0385 0.0385
8 21 2 7 0.6225 0.0759 0.1212 0.0856
9 12 0 4 0.6225 0.0759 0.0000 .
10 8 2 4 0.4150 0.1300 0.4000 0.2771
11 2 0 1 0.4150 0.1300 0.0000 .
12 1 0 1 0.4150 0.1300 0.0000 .
Population: Panel.
successful bailout. The last bankruptcies occur 10 years after the subsidy. The lost cases (column
4) are the censored observations ending in a given period. For example, in the seventh year the
number of lost cases reaches nine, meaning that nine ﬁrms that were subsidized seven years before
2003 survived.
The estimates of survivor and hazard functions with their standard errors are also depicted in
ﬁgure 1, where vertical lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The empirical hazard function has
a peak in the fourth year and drops after that. This peak is reﬂected in the concave-shaped step of
the survivor function: when the probability of bankruptcy grows, the probability of survival goes
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Figure 1: Empirical hazard and survivor functions.
year, the adjusted number of observations drops below 20. In such a sample, a single bankruptcy
is given too much weight. For this reason, I ﬁnd the estimates for the eighth and the following
years unreliable and I ignore them in the further discussion.
15If bailouts were helping ﬁrms to stay in the market, the hazard would be close to zero and
decreasing in time. Unexpectedly, I ﬁnd a diﬀerent pattern. During the ﬁrst year the hazard
decreases a little, reﬂecting the fact that some ﬁrms decide to liquidate immediately. Then the
hazard increases and reaches the peak of 12% in the fourth year. Only after that it drops to low
levels. Such a pattern suggests a ”cash-and-carry” behavior: ﬁrms use the subsidy to delay their
exit up to four years. The scale of this phenomenon is not negligible: 16 out of 75 ﬁrms went
bankrupt within four years after receiving an R&R subsidy.
3.2 Hazard rate estimation
Methodology
To the best of my knowledge, the hazard rate for R&R beneﬁciaries has never been estimated.
The only empirical study on R&R aid so far, Chindooroy et al. (2005), provides estimates for a
time-invariant probability of survival. Their results show that rescue subsidy beneﬁciaries have
a lower survival chance than ﬁrms getting a restructuring subsidy, while subsidies granted after
the year 1999 provide ﬁrms with higher survival chance than subsidies granted earlier. As an
estimation method they use a single-period discrete choice model. However, according to Shumway
(2001) and the following literature, discrete choice models with cross-sectional data give biased and
inconsistent estimates of the probability of survival. This is because single-period models do not
take into account time changes in the proportion of surviving subjects: if a ﬁrm went bankrupt, it
is denoted as bankrupt no matter how long it lived after the subsidy. Censored observations, on
the other hand, meaning ﬁrms which survive until the end of the observation period, are counted as
survivors for ever, although it cannot be excluded that they go bankrupt later. This is particularly
important for my data, since I have a signiﬁcant number of censored observations.
The drawbacks of discrete choice models are resolved by the hazard rate approach. Hazard
rate is deﬁned as instantaneous probability of an event (e.g. bankruptcy) at a time point. The
main characteristic of hazard models is that they deﬁne event’s risk at each point in time. This
allows to code bankrupt and censored ﬁrms correctly as active or not at a certain point in time.
In addition, time-varying variables and hence more information can be utilized.
I estimate the hazard rate of bankruptcy for R&R aid beneﬁciaries for 12 years after receiving
the subsidy. The data is discrete in time: instead of precise dates, only the years of the subsidy
beginning and the bankruptcies are registered. In theory, however, ﬁrms may go bankrupt on any
working day of the year, so the underlying true hazard is continuous. For such data, empirical sur-
16vival literature proposes a complementary log-logistic (or cloglog) speciﬁcation.20 Complementary
log-logistic hazard is a discrete analog of the log-logistic hazard model. It is particularly suitable
for data with few nonzero outcomes due to the asymmetry of its tails: the right tail converges to
one more quickly than the left tail converges to zero, so that the positive values are given more
weight (Buckley, Westerland (2004)). Hazard rate in a time interval j is simply the probability of
bankruptcy in this interval conditional on surviving up to the beginning of the interval, which can
be written as
h(j,Xj) =
S(j,Xj) − S(j − 1,Xj)
S(j − 1,Xj)
, (1)
where Xj a vector of subject characteristics in period j. S is the survivor function given by
S(j,Xj) = exp(−H(j)exp(β0Xj)), (2)
with Hj denoting an integrated baseline hazard of all intervals up to j. Baseline hazard is a part of
the bankruptcy probability that depends only on the time spent under treatment and is common
for all subjects.
Substituting (2) into (1) and manipulating the formula21 I get the equation to estimate:
h(j,Xj) = 1 − exp[−exp(β0Xj + γj)], (3)
which describes the probability of bankruptcy in period j as a cloglog function of subject charac-
teristics X and a function of time γj = log(H(j) − H(j − 1)).
Implementation





1 if ﬁrm i went bankrupt in year j,
0 otherwise.
(4)
As the subject characteristics X I consider the following explanatory variables. To estimate
20Cloglog function is deﬁned as g(x) = 1 − exp[−exp(x)].
21see Jenkins (2005), p.41.





0 if ﬁrm i got only a rescue subsidy,
1 if ﬁrm i got a restructuring subsidy.
(5)
The dummy equals one also in all cases, where both a rescue and a restructuring aid were granted.
I expect the coeﬃcient to be negative, since restructuring aid should ensure lower bankruptcy
probability of the beneﬁciary than rescue aid. Potentially, this variable might be endogenous. The
subsidy type, which is chosen by the government, could be correlated with the error term from the
equation. For example, a ﬁrm which is a monopolist (like a state-wide railway) has a very strong
bargaining power, which can have inﬂuence on both the subsidy type and the hazard. But in my
data set I do not have information on market power of aid receivers, so this correlation is captured
by the error term and creates an endogeneity problem. As a consequence, the estimates might be
biased. Another problem is the potential selection process: governments may grant restructuring
aid to big public ﬁrms and rescue aid to small private ﬁrms. As a result, the variation, which
in equation 6 is attributed to the subsidy type, in fact results from other variables or the error
term. I deal with these problems explicitly by modelling the government’s choice and applying a
simultaneous estimation in section 5.
I include LNAGE variable, which is the natural logarithm of years from incorporation to the
subsidy year. I expect the coeﬃcient of this variable to be negative, reﬂecting the fact that a
longer market presence gives know-how which decreases the bankruptcy probability.
A variable of particular interest is ﬁrm’s ownership PUBLICi, equal to one if the state has a
majority stake in ﬁrm i. If public ﬁrms are less eﬃcient than private ﬁrms, the estimated coeﬃcient
of this variable should be positive. On the other hand, if public ownership is of an advantage in
ﬁnancial distress due to lobbying or high bargaining power, the coeﬃcient will be negative.
The size of a ﬁrm is represented by a logarithm of its average employment. I separate public
from private employment by using two variables: SIZEPUBLICi and SIZEPRIVATEi. I expect
the coeﬃcients to be negative - if bailouts prevent job cuts, they should work out especially in case
of big ﬁrms.
Bankruptcy literature claims that sector characteristics are signiﬁcant determinants of sur-
vival (e.g. Shumway (2001)). I therefore add dummies for industries, in which ﬁrms were active:
INFRASTR for electricity, transportation and ﬁnancial services, SERVICE for services and trade
and MINMAN for mining and manufacturing. Construction sector is left out as a reference cate-
18gory.
Finally, a function of time needs to be estimated (γj from equation (3)) to capture duration
dependence. Since the empirical hazard rate as depicted in ﬁgure 1 does not have any typical shape,
I choose to specify the baseline hazard in a non-parametric way: I create dummies for each survived
after the subsidy year. There are four years, in which no bankruptcies were observed (6, 9, 11 and
12), so the hazard cannot be calculated. As survival literature recommends, I drop observations
from these years and the total number of observations decreases to 355. When predicting the
hazard for those years, I assume that it is the same as in the preceding year.
I ﬁt the following equation:
P(BANKRj = 1) =g(β1TYPE + β2LNAGE + β3PUBLIC+ (6)
+β4SIZEPUBLIC + β5SIZEPRIVATE + β6INFRASTR




where g(x) = 1−exp[−exp(x)] is the complementary log-logistic function, j is a year index and a
ﬁrm index i is omitted for the ease of exposition. I estimate three models with diﬀerent variable
sets, since for a few ﬁrms data on PUBLIC, LNAGE and employment is missing. Adding these
variables to the regression reduces the number of observations. Standard errors were adjusted for
within-ﬁrms correlation. Marginal eﬀects were calculated for the average value of each variable.
I estimate (6) by the conditional maximum likelihood method. Apart from its doubtless ad-
vantages like asymptotic eﬃciency and consistency, it allows to account for censoring very easily.
Suppose a subject i went bankrupt in year j and T(j) is a bankruptcy indicator for period j.
The likelihood contribution of such a (non-censored) observation i is P(Ti = j). For a cen-
sored observation i that survives until the last time period j, the likelihood contribution simply
is P(Ti > j) = Si(j,Xi). In this way, information from censored observations can be correctly
extracted in the estimation.
Results
Marginal eﬀects are presented in table 9.22
22As a quick robustness check, I estimate a simple probit with one observation per subsidized ﬁrm, like in Chin-
dooroy et al (2005). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for bankrupt ﬁrms and zero for surviving
ﬁrms. Instead of baseline hazard dummies, I use a dummy RECENT equal to one for subsidies after 2000. The
sings of all coeﬃcients are the same as in the cloglog model and the coeﬃcient on RECENT is negative, conﬁrming
the model’s stability.
19Table 9: Estimates of marginal eﬀects on the hazard rate.
Dependent variable: bankruptcy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Subsidy and ﬁrm characteristics












service -0.018 -0.012 0.042
(0.110) (0.389) (0.467)
minman -0.013 -0.008 0.021
(0.344) (0.590) (0.253)
Baseline hazard dummies
γ1 -0.026∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.092∗∗
(0.015) (0.029) (0.046)
γ2 -0.032∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.081∗
(0.017) (0.060) (0.055)
γ3 -0.018 -0.024 -0.065∗∗
(0.103) (0.128) (0.048)
γ4 -0.004 -0.010 -0.050∗∗
(0.792) (0.569) (0.025)
γ5 -0.027∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.034) (0.068) (0.012)
γ7 -0.024∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.036) (0.003)
γ8 -0.007 -0.010 -0.038∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.531) (0.004)
γ10 0.057 0.043 -0.030∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.456) (0.007)
N 355 321 297
Nonzero outcomes 22 19 18
chi2 163.613 142.823 157.450
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Population: Panel. P-values in parenthesis.
***(**,*) denotes signiﬁcance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-tailed Wald test.
20The marginal eﬀect for TYPE is signiﬁcant and as expected negative. Ceteris paribus, ﬁrms
which get a restructuring subsidy face the probability of bankruptcy about 10% lower than ﬁrms
with only rescue aid. Restructuring aid is indeed more eﬀective in preventing exit of ﬁrms in
trouble. It provides ﬁrms with more public funds, it assists them for a longer time-period, and it
forces ﬁrms to introduce restructuring measures aimed at recovering vitality. Still, the eﬀect might
be biased due to endogeneity, which I directly address in section 5.
Age of the ﬁrms can be understood a proxy for its market experience and know-how. My
estimates suggest, however, that it is irrelevant for the hazard rate. Marginal eﬀects for LNAGE
are close to zero and highly insigniﬁcant. This is in line with results in bankruptcy literature
(Shumway(2001)). PUBLIC and both employment variables also turned out to be unimportant
for the hazard. Marginal eﬀects of public ownership and public employment are insigniﬁcant.
Private employment has the most signiﬁcant eﬀect of about 1%, suggesting that the bigger a
private ﬁrm, the higher bankruptcy probability.
Bailouts worked the best in the infrastructure sectors (transport, electricity and ﬁnancial ser-
vices), for which the greatest and most signiﬁcant industry eﬀect is observed. Their probability
of bankruptcy is 4% lower in every year after the subsidy. These are the critical sectors for the
country’s economy and their bankruptcy would result in high negative externalities.
Most of baseline hazard dummies are signiﬁcant, suggesting a strong duration dependence
in the survival process. For the interpretation, diﬀerences in their absolute values are of the
greatest interest, so I plot the predicted hazard. Figure 2 illustrates the results for model 1, as
the one with the highest joint signiﬁcance. The plots show predicted hazard rates for ﬁrms in the
manufacturing sector which received rescue or restructure subsidy. I ignore predictions from the
eighth year onwards as unreliable due to small sample on which they are estimated.
The predicted hazard has a small drop after the ﬁrst year, indicating that there are some ﬁrms,
which exit immediately after receiving the subsidy. These ﬁrms do not even try to restructure
and, as rescue aid is limited in time, they do not live on the means provided by the subsidy.
From the second to the fourth year the hazard is increasing: more and more ﬁrms exit. After the
fourth year, the hazard drops and stays at a lower level. This pattern suggests a dominance of the
”cash-and-carry” eﬀect: ﬁrms cash the subsidy and enjoy it for some years before they eventually
exit. Note also a large diﬀerence in the predicted hazard for rescue and restructuring cases. In the
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Figure 2: Predicted hazard functions for the ﬁrst 7 years.
3.3 Policy implications
Comparison to Chapter 11 protection
The objective of R&R aid is the same objective as the objective of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act in the United States passed in 1978: to prevent exit of the ﬁrm and the losses of jobs and
know-how. However, Chapter 11 involves no public money. Instead, it provides businesses in
distress with protection against their creditors. The negotiations between the ﬁrm in trouble and
its creditors take place in a bankruptcy court. As a result, the debt is often reduced and some
of the assets are transferred to the creditors. During the years 2001-2004, the average number of
ﬁllings for Chapter 11 protection in the US reached 10 675.23
Studies on Chapter 11 deﬁne the analyzed event as an exit from Chapter 11 protection, which
means return to vitality in nearly all cases (Li (1998)). Li(1999) applies a log-logistic hazard model
with Bayesian analysis on a sample of 83 ﬁrms ﬁlling for protection in the years 1980-1994, 79 of
which exit the protection before August 1994. His results show that bigger ﬁrms, with lower ﬁrm
value, and running legal disputes stay longer under Chapter 11 protection. His estimated hazard
function has an inverted U-shape, it grows during the ﬁrst 21 months and then decreases to zero.
233.12.2004 News Release, Administrative Oﬃce of the U.S. Courts.
22Bandopadhyaya (1994) in contrast uses the Weibull distribution speciﬁcation with the sample of
74 ﬁrms in trouble from years 1979-1990, 43 of which emerged after Chapter 11 protection as
a viable business. The results suggest that the higher outstanding interest in the ﬁrm and the
higher capacity utilization in the industry, the shorter time spent under Chapter 11 protection.
The estimated probability of leaving Chapter 11 as a vital business increases with time.
For R&R subsidies the result is opposite: the probability of exit increases in the ﬁrst four years.
This is an alarming signal of shortcomings in the European bailout policy. Many ﬁrms manage to
extract public funds and delay their exit. The diﬀerence between these opposite outcomes is most
likely related to the diﬀerence in the incentives the two programs create. Chapter 11 protection is
costly to the ﬁrm in trouble by the cost of legal services, by the cost of lost clients and contracts
that look for a more stable business partner and by the lost equity which creditors get in return
for cancelling some unpaid credits. Therefore, ﬁrms have incentives to quickly drop out of the
protection program. In contrast, it is not costly for ﬁrms in trouble to take part in a state subsidy
program. It is rather an advantage. The ﬁrms get aid and do not give any equity away. In this
way, incentives to apply for aid are created also for those ﬁrms, which could survive without aid,
or those, which have no chance to survive.
European bailout control
All bailouts in the data set were granted by European governments and accepted by the Commission
as compatible with the common market. A compatible bailout should have high chances for
survival. Therefore, I can asses the Commission’s performance by counting how many times the
Commission approved a bailout which had low probability of survival predicted by my hazard rate
model (I use model 1 from table 9). This is the so-called type II error in the decision process:
a failure to prohibit a non-compatible aid. Prohibition of compatible aid (type I error) does not
exist in my data set, since the Commission usually does not prohibit notiﬁed aid cases. However, I
argue in this section that the Commission should be more tough in the aid approval process. This
would allow to avoid a number failing bailouts.
Since the ﬁrst four years show the highest mortality, it makes sense to measure success or failure
of a bailout by the probability of surviving at least the ﬁrst four years. I predict this probability
for every ﬁrm in the population and count the number of ﬁrms for which the predicted probability
is lower than a given threshold. Out of these ﬁrms, I count the number of ﬁrms, which went
bankrupt ex post. Table 10 presents the results.
23Table 10: European bailout control.
Policy goal Approved bailouts missing the goal





The policy goal is the required minimal probability of survival for at least 4 years, which is
used by the Commission when deciding about compatibility of a bailout. Applying the most loose
deﬁnition and putting the policy goal at the level of 50% gives 7 (from the total 86) subsidy
approvals, which should not have been granted. In that case, 5 ex post bankrupt beneﬁciaries
would not have been supported, although the remaining two ex post survivors would not have been
subsidized as well. In case of the most strict approach of the required 90% survival probability,
every second bailout should not have been approved. That would allow to avoid 13 subsidies to
ﬁrms exiting later. The best policy goal seems to be 70%: prohibition of these 8 bailouts would
allow to avoid subsidizing 6 ex post bankrupt ﬁrms, leaving at the same time 2 ex post surviving
ﬁrms without help.
Bankruptcies of bailed-out ﬁrms are rather frequent. And the real scale of mistaken decisions
is higher than that, since my error assessment does not cover another type of error in the decision-
making process of the Commission. If a ﬁrm survives but does not achieve bailout’s objectives,
the bailout also fails. An example of such situation is when the restructuring process is not
satisfactory and the ﬁrm needs continuing state support, like in the cases breaking the one time
-last time principle. For this reason, I ﬁnd that decision-making process in the European bailout
control shows signiﬁcant shortcomings. Its eﬀectiveness in terms of helping the ﬁrms to survive
could be improved by eliminating cases with too low survival probability. In the assessment of this
probability, ﬁrms should be required to survive at least four years. My estimates suggest that the
most likely to go bankrupt are ﬁrms receiving rescue aid and ﬁrms from manufacturing, mining,
construction, trade and services sectors.
4 R&R aid and industrial policy: how governments bail out
One of the results of the previous section is that the subsidy type is a very important bankruptcy
determinant. Rescue aid generates lower survival chances than restructuring aid. It is therefore of
greatest interest to identify determinants of governments’ decisions to grant rescue vs. restructuring
24subsidy24.
When governments decide to bail out a ﬁrm in diﬃculty, they choose one of the two types
of R&R subsidies: rescue aid, which is limited in time, amount and form, and restructuring aid,
which is long-term, can be granted in any form and is high enough to facilitate the restructuring
process. Therefore, a ﬁrm receiving restructuring aid gets substantially more support from the
state than a ﬁrm receiving only rescue aid.
The choice of the subsidy type is an outcome of the government’s bailout policy. I identify
determinants of this policy by estimating a discrete choice model with the dependent variable
TYPEi as deﬁned in (5). When TYPEi equals zero, the government gives ﬁrm i only a chance
to look for other support by subsidizing current expenses for six months. But when TYPEi is of
unit value, the government engages in the ﬁrm much more by paying for the restructuring process.
This choice reveals government’s industrial policy preferences: certain ﬁrms get more public funds
than other ﬁrms.
I estimate a probit model
Pr(TYPEi = 1) = Φ(β0Xi), (7)
where i = 1,...,79 is a ﬁrm index, Φ is a c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution and X is a vector
of exogenous explanatory variables. A few explanatory variables are considered, each representing
a theoretical argument for a particular government’s choice.
OWNERSHIP. The literature on soft-budget constraints claims that public ﬁrms are more likely
to face soft public crediting than private ﬁrms (for a survey, see Maskin and Xu (2001)). As an
owner and a creditor in one body, the government has too little bargaining power to refuse risky
credits. Public ﬁrms are also likely to be more eﬃcient in lobbying the government than private
ﬁrms. To measure the impact of public ownership on governments’ bailout decisions, I add to the
vector X the dummy variable PUBLICi. I expect its coeﬃcient to be positive.
EMPLOYMENT. Bigger ﬁrms are likely to get more support than small ﬁrms, since their bank-
ruptcy would result in a higher social cost of many unemployed workers. Big ﬁrms are also often
highly unionized, so that their workers are a stronger partner to negotiate with. From the govern-
ment’s point of view, however, there are big diﬀerences between public and private employment.
24Theoretically, I could compare the populations of ﬁrms bankrupt without aid with R&R aid beneﬁciaries to
examine criteria of the government’s choice of aid beneﬁciaries. However, it seems to be an infeasible task, since I
am not aware of a data set with bankrupt ﬁrms across Europe.
25For political economy reasons, governments might be interested in supporting public employment
more than private employment (Frey and Pommerehne, 1982). Public employees have a higher
participation rate in elections than the rest of the electorate and are known to support higher pub-
lic expenditures. In addition, unions in big public ﬁrms are better organized and hence workers
have a strong bargaining power against the government. I use the variables SIZEPUBLICi and
SIZEPRIVATEi to distinguish between these two types of employment. I expect both coeﬃcients
in the regression to be positive.
INDUSTRY EFFECTS. To avoid negative externalities in the economy, ﬁrms in certain sectors
could be getting more support. For example, railways or electricity generation and supply provide
infrastructure to the rest of the economy. They are often monopolists and their bankruptcy
could paralyze economic activity in the whole country. This gives them a strong bargaining
power against governments, which they can exploit in bailouts (see Segal (1998) on soft-budget
constraints in monopolies). Large banks are called ”too-big-to-fail”, since the negative externality
of a bank’s bankruptcy are not only lay oﬀs, but also lost deposits of ﬁrms and private customers
(see, for example, Hughes and Mester (1993)). I measure this eﬀect by including a dummy variable
INFRASTRi equal to one if ﬁrm i is active in electricity, transport or ﬁnancial services sector. A
dummy for mining and manufacturing MINMANi and a dummy for trade and services SERVICEi
are also included. Construction sector is left out as a reference category.
COUNTRY EFFECTS. To allow for cross-country diﬀerences in the bailout policy I include dum-
mies for ﬁve countries with the highest number of bailouts: Germany, Italy, France, Spain and
Austria.
RECENT. Table 1 indicated that in the year 2001 there was a ﬂip in the proportions of rescue
versus restructuring cases in the total subsidy number. This was most likely caused by political
pressure at the European level to limit R&R aid. I include a variable RECENT equal to 1 for
subsidies granted in years 2001-2003 and 0 otherwise to account for possible time eﬀects. I expect
its estimated coeﬃcient to be negative.
I report marginal eﬀects calculated for the average value of each variable in table 11. Only 65
ﬁrms are used in the estimation, due to the fact that for the remaining 14 ﬁrms data on variables
PUBLIC or employment size are missing. To facilitate an interesting insight, I include two models
with diﬀerent covariates representing employment.
The most signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect of −68.5% is noted for the RECENT dummy. Firms
26Table 11: Estimates of marginal eﬀects in industrial policy equation.
Dependent variable: SUBSIDY TYPE
Variable Model 1 p-values Model 2 p-values
Firm characteristics
recent -0.685∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.685∗∗∗ 0.000




Industry and country eﬀects
infrastr 0.218 0.377 0.123 0.679
service 0.138 0.644 -0.007 0.986
minman -0.078 0.718 -0.211 0.362
Germany -0.029 0.906 -0.120 0.653
Italy -0.358 0.204 -0.515∗∗ 0.042
France -0.305 0.372 -0.463 0.138
Spain 0.050 0.851 0.014 0.962






Population: Cross-section. ***(**,*) denotes signiﬁcance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-
tailed Wald test.
27subsidized after the year 2000 had a 68.52% lower chance of getting a restructuring subsidy than
ﬁrms subsidized before 2001, ceteris paribus. This time eﬀect is very strong, suggesting that bailout
policy of governments has starkly changed in the recent years. The Lisbon Strategy announced in
2000 might be a driver of this change.
In both speciﬁcations the marginal eﬀect of public ownership is statistically signiﬁcant, however
it has opposite signs. In the ﬁrst model, the estimate reaches 29%. In the second model, when
I control for public and private employment separately, the eﬀect of public ownership turns into
−78.1%. The coeﬃcients on both types of employment in model 2 are not signiﬁcant. Still, p-
values are not too high, so it is worth to interpret the marginal eﬀects. The eﬀect of private
employment is negative and the eﬀect of public employment is positive. How to think of these
results? Public ownership alone does not increase chances for restructuring of aid, in contrary to
what I expected, but it decreases these chances dramatically. What makes governments to spend
more money on a bailout is actually public employment. The bigger public ﬁrms, the more likely
restructuring aid. Employment in private ﬁrms has the opposite eﬀect: the bigger a private ﬁrm,
the less likely restructuring aid. That puts the argument of the prevention of job losses by bailouts
in a doubtful light: public jobs are indeed supported more, but private jobs are disadvantaged.
Industry eﬀects are highly insigniﬁcant. Among country eﬀects, ITALY eﬀect is signiﬁcant,
negative and pretty large. Holding everything else constant, Italian ﬁrms were less likely to receive
restructuring aid by about 51%. The eﬀect of France is is close to signiﬁcant and, surprisingly,
negative.
Robustness
Several robustness checks were performed. First, I redeﬁne the variable RECENT as time trend,
time squared, logarithm of time and annual or biannual dummies. The results were robust to
these changes in sign and signiﬁcance, but the model with the dummy had the highest joint-
signiﬁcance χ2 statistics. Therefore, I use RECENT as the best trend-indicator. Second, I estimate
the equation using the logit model. Results are very similar as the probit estimates, suggesting
the model’s stability. Third, I use ﬁrms’ age as a regressor. Age is measured in years between
incorporation and the subsidy. The coeﬃcient was insigniﬁcant in the regression and I decided to
omit it because of numerous missing data in this variable.
28Privatization and old public ﬁrms
Two important variables were perfectly predicting the subsidy choice. The ﬁrst one is privatization.
Privatization through bailouts means that a public ﬁrm was bailed out and, after receiving the
subsidy, it was sold to private owners. Among all bailouts in years 1992-2003, privatization was
involved in 13 cases. In a few cases, it was a requirement of the Commission in the approval
process, but usually it was an initiative of the governments themselves. All 13 privatized ﬁrms got
restructuring aid, implying that governments used substantial public funds to increase the value
of the ﬁrm before the subsequent sale.
The second perfect predictor is age for public ﬁrms. All 8 public ﬁrms older than 100 years
received exclusively restructuring aid, suggesting that governments supported old public brands.
Summary
Summing up, the time dummy has the most important impact on the governments’ choice of the
subsidy type. The estimates suggest that there was a structural change in the bailout policy: after
the year 2000 governments chose rescue subsidies with a higher probability than restructuring aid,
and the opposite is true for the earlier years. Public ﬁrms get more restructuring aid mainly due
to governments’ preference to support public employment. Industrial sectors do not matter in the
policy choice. Italian governments grant rescue aid somewhat more often than restructuring aid,
while other governments do not have a special policy.
5 Endogenous subsidy choice
In section 3, I estimated a hazard rate equation and noted that the subsidy type variable is likely
to be endogenous. In section 4, I examined the choice of the subsidy type by the government. In
this section, I ﬁnally estimate both equations from the previous sections simultaneously. This will
allow us to correct for potential endogeneity in the hazard equation. It is also a useful robustness
check for the earlier results.
Since estimators for a simultaneous model in which one equation is a discrete-time hazard rate
are to my knowledge not available, 25 I translate the hazard rate equation into a time-invariant
binary outcome equation with one observation per ﬁrm. Duration dependence will then be captured
by adding the RECENT dummy.
25For a continuous-time hazard, a full information maximum-likelihood estimator was recently proposed by
Boehmke et al.(2006).
29The problem has a recursive nature: ﬁrst the government decides which type of aid to grant and
then competition in the market forces the ﬁrms to exit or not. The error terms in both equations
could be correlated if there are unobservable factors that have an impact both on the subsidy type
choice and the bankruptcy chances. Examples of such factor are the degree of ﬁrms’ unionization,
politicians having private information about ﬁrms, or ﬁnancial variables like debt size. In the
equations, I do not control for them directly, but I take them into account by adding error terms.
The econometric model which best ﬁts this situation is a bivariate probit (see Maddala (1983) or





1X1i + 1i > 0) IndustrialPolicy
BANKRi = I(αTYPEi + β0
2X2i + 2i > 0), Bankruptcy
(8)
where i is a ﬁrm index, vector (1,2) has a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero, unit
variances and corr(1,2) = ρ. I apply conditional maximum likelihood method.
Table 12 presents the results. To facilitate a comparison, I include estimates of coeﬃcients for
several models. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 are the results of single equation probit estimations. Models
3 and 6 are the simultaneous speciﬁcations. In models 1-3 I control for employment in general,
while in models 4-6 I distinguish between private and public employment.
The log-likelihood of the simultaneous models is higher than the sum of the log-likelihoods for
the two equations estimated separately. The likelihood ratio test indeed rejects the hypothesis that
ρ = 0 (for model 3: test statistics χ2(1) = 6.7956, p-value 0.0091, for model 6: χ2(1) = 6.04384,
p-value 0.0140). According to Monfardini and Radice (2006), the likelihood-ratio test is the right
method to test correlation of equations in case of small samples. Therefore, the results indicate
that the equations in model (8) are correlated: unobserved factors inﬂuencing the chance for a
restructuring aid have impact on the probability of bankruptcy.
Simultaneous estimation of both equations (models 3 and 6) does not change the coeﬃcients’
estimates too much, but suggests that the endogeneity issue is important for the results. In
the bankruptcy equation of the simultaneous models, the coeﬃcient on TYPE decreases when
compared with the independent estimation. This is the impact of the correct speciﬁcation, which
takes the endogeneity of this variable into account. The exogenous treatment of the subsidy type
(models 2 and 5) underestimates its real eﬀect on the bankruptcy probability.
In the industrial policy equation of model 3, the positive coeﬃcient of PUBLIC becomes smaller
and less signiﬁcant than in model 1, but its p-value of 0.157 is still not too high. This result
30Table 12: Estimates of coeﬃcients in the bivariate probit model.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Industrial policy
recent -2.031∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗ -2.040∗∗∗ -1.737∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
public 0.821∗ 0.582 -2.532 -3.220







infrastr 0.649 0.883 0.346 0.676
(0.433) (0.259) (0.694) (0.336)
service 0.409 0.345 -0.019 -0.279
(0.679) (0.710) (0.986) (0.782)
minman -0.211 -0.150 -0.581 -0.395
(0.720) (0.823) (0.377) (0.562)
Germany -0.077 -0.207 -0.318 -0.693
(0.906) (0.726) (0.650) (0.215)
France -0.788 -0.462 -1.237 -1.072
(0.382) (0.504) (0.207) (0.151)
Italy -0.931 -1.130 -1.406 -1.750∗∗
(0.227) (0.108 ) (0.101) (0.042)
Spain 0.139 -0.114 0.037 -0.386
(0.854) (0.857) (0.962) (0.568)
Austria -0.055 -0.221 -0.385 -0.796
(0.953) (0.781) (0.694) (0.342)
constant 0.989 1.48 2.871 4.321∗∗
(0.444) (0.281) (0.111) (0.030)
Bankruptcy
Subsidy type -1.496∗∗∗ -2.679∗∗∗ -1.491∗∗∗ -2.611∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
recent -1.339∗∗ -1.845∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗ -2.026∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
public -0.053 0.301 1.487 1.153







service -0.327 -0.498 -0.180 -0.295
(0.711) (0.512) (0.841) (0.694)
minman 0.296 0.130 0.372 0.244
(0.460) (0.720) (0.367) (0.523)
constant 0.673 1.639∗ -0.143 1.042
(0.480) (0.059) (0.914) (0.397)
N 65 65 65 65 65 65
pseudo-R2 0.277 0.190 0.307 0.200
log-likelihood -30.936 -32.489 -60.403 -29.667 -32.090 -58.359
chi2 23.74 15.26 68.65 26.277 16.061 68.308
p 0.013 0.000 0.018 0.010 0.025 0.000
Population: Cross-section. P-values in parenthesis.
***(**,*) denotes signiﬁcance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-tailed Wald test.
31suggests that public ﬁrms have a better chance to receive restructuring aid than private ﬁrms.
The coeﬃcient of PUBLIC in the bankruptcy equation is, however, not signiﬁcant, suggesting that
public ﬁrms are not better in survival than private ﬁrms. Therefore, governments’ preference for
public ﬁrms cannot be explained by these ﬁrms’ higher probability of fulﬁlling bailouts’ goals.
The eﬀect of SIZEPRIVATE in model 6 becomes signiﬁcant and much lower than in model
4. That suggests that the bigger a private ﬁrm, the less likely restructuring aid. The size of
public ﬁrms is less important for the subsidy choice. This observation supports the earlier claim
that governments discriminate between public and private employment to the disadvantage of the
latter.
The coeﬃcient’s estimates for the RECENT variable increase in the industrial policy equation
of the simultaneous models, and decrease in the bankruptcy equation. Coeﬃcients for country
eﬀects become more signiﬁcant. Italian governments clearly stand out as using more rescue aid
than other governments.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to assess bailouts’ eﬀectiveness in preventing exit of ﬁrms in trou-
ble and to identify the determinants of the governments’ subsidy decisions. For this purpose, I
construct a unique data set for the population of all 86 bailout cases approved by the European
Commission during the period 1995-2003.
The estimated hazard rate in the population of bailed-out ﬁrms suggests that roughly one-third
of ﬁrms used the subsidy to postpone the inevitable exit by up to four years. A comparison of
this outcome with the hazard rate of ﬁrms protected by Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Act
suggests that R&R aid is less eﬀective in preventing ﬁrms’ exit than Chapter 11. Firms getting
restructuring aid and ﬁrms from transportation, electricity and banking services sectors had the
highest survival chances. I ﬁnd that public ﬁrms receive more support due to the preference to
support ﬁrms for privatization, old public ﬁrms and public employment. At the same time, public
ﬁrms are not better in survival than private ﬁrms. Private employment is supported with rescue
rather than restructuring aid. The tendency to grant more rescue than restructuring aid is noted
in the years after 2000, suggesting that political pressure to limit this kind of aid was eﬀective.
Finally, I show that the subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate.
Treating it as exogenous underestimates its real impact on the bankruptcy probability.
The results drive a few policy conclusions. First, a stricter European bailout control could
32reduce the number of failing bailouts. A simple strategy could be, for example, not to allow rescue
aid in manufacturing, mining, construction, trade and services sectors. According to my estimates,
they had the highest probability of only postponing the inevitable exit. Rescue aid was generally
highly ineﬀective, with only about 50% chance of survival.
Second, replacing R&R aid with a bankruptcy regulation closer to Chapter 11 could be more
eﬀective in preventing ﬁrms’ exit. In case of R&R aid, public money is used and delay of exit
for one-third of ﬁrms is observed. Under Chapter 11 protection, taxpayers don’t contribute to
the bailout and still most of ﬁrms manage to survive (Li(1998)). The crucial diﬀerence is in the
incentives that both systems create. R&R aid beneﬁciaries get support for free, while ﬁrms under
Chapter 11 protection have to agree with the creditors and usually give away some of their equity.
Therefore, managers are attracted by the ﬁrst option, but they rather avoid the second one. One
could also think of remedies in R&R aid to change this incentive eﬀect.
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The data set contains information on R&R subsidy cases in the European Union in years 1995-
2003. It is a unique data set created from four data sources. Subsidy information comes from the
texts of the European Commission’s decision and the report by London Economics (2004) provided
by Competition Directorate General. Financial and ownership information on ﬁrms from sectors
other than ﬁnancial comes from AMADEUS database provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing. For ﬁrms from the ﬁnancial sector I use annual reports, if available. Other ﬁrm-level
data comes from newspapers.
I construct three data sets. A cross-section of decisions is a set with a decision as a unit
of observation, it entails 86 observations in total. A cross-section of ﬁrms is a set with a ﬁrm
receiving R&R aid as a unit of observation, it entails 79 observations in total. Finally, a panel is
a two-dimensional set with aid receivers observed across time.
I build a panel based on the following principles. Subjects in the panel are all R&R subsidy
beneﬁciaries, whose surviving status is known in at least one year. This amounts to 75 ﬁrms. Each
ﬁrm was observed from the year it was bailed out until 2003 or its earlier bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
is deﬁned as ceasing the major activity of a ﬁrm. 22 R&R subsidy beneﬁciaries went bankrupt
in the time between receiving the subsidy and the end of 2003. The remaining 53 ﬁrms were
observed until the year 2003 without going bankrupt. Following the survival literature, I call them
right-censored or lost, but in my context they are simply ﬁrms, which from the subsidy year up to
352003 stayed in operations. All in all, for the survival analysis I have an unbalanced panel of 409
observations, with 75 ﬁrms observed during the years 1992-2003.
Table 13: Variables used and their sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Subsidy year Year of subsidy transfer decision texts
Subsidy type Rescue or restructure decision texts
Country Country of the subsidizing government decision texts
State-owned Dummy equal to 1 if the state owns more
than 50% of shares
decision texts, AMADEUS, LE report
Year of incorporation Year in which the ﬁrm started operations AMADEUS, LE report
Year of bankruptcy Year in which the ﬁrm went bankrupt LE report, newspapers
Industry Industry with the highest share in the rev-
enue, based on NACE (see table 14)
AMADEUS, LE report
For sale Dummy equal to 1 if after getting the sub-
sidy the ﬁrm was sold.
LE report, newspapers
Employment Number of employees AMADEUS, LE report, annual reports
Industry classiﬁcation
NACE (Rev.1) comes from the French term Nomenclature statistique des Activit´ es ´ economiques
dans la Communaut´ e Europ´ eenne (Statistical classiﬁcation of economic activities in the European
Community) and is a European industry classiﬁcation system. At the 2-digit level NACE is fully
compatible with ISIC.
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